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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES
FOSTER H. SHERWOOD
Most students of government are coming to recognize the importance of
administrative action as the very essence of government. This awareness
is of comparatively recent origin, dating back not much more than a gener-
ation. As it has grown there has developed a resistance based logically on a
solicitude for individual rights. It is now recognized that the most difficult
problem of American government is that of establishing and maintaining the
delicate balance between the general welfare and individual rights of person
and property. This problem is revealed in sharp relief in the field of pro-
cedural administrative law as it is affected by the guarantees in the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution. It is emphasized by the demonstrated and
growing unwillingness of the federal courts to inquire too closely into the
substance of administrative decisions.
The Bill of Rights most frequently imposes limitations on administrative
procedure (as distinguished from administrative action) with respect to the
following guarantees: freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures;
from compulsory self-incrimination; of jury trial; and of procedural due
process of law. Other guarantees, such as habeas corpus, are not a part of
the administrative process, or, like freedom of speech and press, are sub-
stantive rather than procedural in form as they affect administrative action,
so that they present no special problems to the student of civil liberties.
Searches and Seizures
Most federal administrative bodies have in their fundamental laws pro-
visions which impose on them two duties: the task of enforcing the law
against individual violators; and the duty of recommending amendments to
the Congress designed to improve the basic statute. Both require investi-
gations, and investigations are seldom successful unless armed with the power
of subpoena.
With respect to investigations incident to the enforcement of existing law,
the federal courts have retreated markedly from their original position which
was one of extreme concern for the privacy of litigants. At one time the
subpoena power was -so narrowly interpreted as to require a showing that
the evidence being sought was required in a current proceeding and not merely
a possible one; that it was needed in a proceeding over which the adminis-
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trative body had jurisdiction; and that even without the evidence, a showing
of probable violation could be made. Retreat from this position has been
along several lines:
1. The Type of Business Being Regulated. As early as Hale v. Henkel
it was implied that corporations had less guarantees than natural persons.'
But the decision in Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. U. S. held that this distinction
was not sound and for a time all respondents were protected equally from
fishing expeditions. 2 The courts next distinguished those businesses affected
with a public interest from ordinary private business, giving to the latter a
greater immunity from searches and seizures. The former, for example,
may be required to submit regular reports which can be used in subsequent
complaint cases.8 And Congress can now authorize an inspection in such
businesses even when no reason to suspect a violation exists,4 or to determine
whether the business falls within the jurisdiction of the agency before filing
a complaint.5 Further, it has become evident that the courts will permit re-
covery of damages for obtaining evidence illegally only in an exceptionally
clear case of flagrant and deliberate violation of this civil right.6
2. The Point at Which the Immunity Will Be Enforced. The Supreme
Court recently concluded on the basis of decisions on searches and
seizures and self-incrimination that "without attempt to summarize or
accurately distinguish all of the cases, the fair distillation, in so far as they
apply merely to the production of corporate records and papers in response
to a subpoena or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanc-
tion, seems to be that the Fifth Amendment affords no protection by virtue
of the self-incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its
officers; and the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against abuse
only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to
'201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1908). This implication was reinforced by language
used in some subsequent cases. Nelson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538 (1910) ;
Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S. 478, 33 Sup. Ct. 158 (1912) ; Linn v. U. S., 251 Fed. 476
(C. C.- A. 2d 1918). See Comment, 40 MIcH. L. Rav. 78 (1941).
2251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920). F. T. C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 336 (1923).
.
8Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. 2d 350 (C. C. A. 7th 1933) cert. denied 290
'U. S. 654, 54 Sup. Ct. 70 (1933). Cf. U. S. v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Miss. 1947).4Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. 2d 384 (C. C. A. 7th 1940) cert. denied
311 U. S. 690, 61 Sup. Ct. 69 (1940).
5N. L. R. B. v. Barrett Co., 120 F. 2d 583 (C. C. A. 7th 1941). It may be noted that
the courts have now come to treat administrative bodies as possessed of powers as broad
at least as those of a grand jury. Cf. Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538
(1910); Boehm v. U. S., 123 F. 2d 791 (C. C. A. 8th 1941).
6jones v. Kennedy, 121 F. 2d 40 (App. D. C. 1941).
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be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency
is authorized by law to make and the-materials specified are relevant.' 7 This
raises the problem of the point at which the inquiry into the agency's juris-
diction and the relevancy of the materials sought may be made. In the same
case the rules applicable to grand jury and Congressional investigation are
held applicable to administrative proceedings: that a complaint or indict-
ment need not be issued prior to the investigation; that the purpose need
only be one that the Congress could authorize; and that the documents
sought be relevant. The Court in this and the Endicott Johnson case8 held
that these are questions to be finally determined normally only after hear-
ing and on review or application for enforcement of the administrative
order. That, so long as in an application for enforcement of the administra-
tive subpoena the administrator or board shows "probable cause," it is
the intent of the Congress that these questions be determined in the first in-
stance by the administrative body rather than through judicial "forecasts
of the probable results of the investigation." 9 These matters are to be deter-
mined by the court at the interlocutory stage on the basis of the pleadings
only, plus such reasonable inferences as the court wishes to draw; which at
least in the Oklahoma Press case were general in the extreme-so much so
that only by assuming a prima facie case for the government was the appli-
cation sustained.
With respect to administrative investigations of value in making recom-
mendations to the Congress, the broadened power of subpoena has had
another basis. Here the courts similarly were very solicitous of the per-
sonal rights of privacy at an early date. But the limit here was one arrived at by
strict interpretation of the statutes authorizing administrative issuance of
subpoenas. Thus when the Interstate Commerce Commission attempted to
conduct a general investigation at the beginning of the century the Supreme
Court put the constitutional issue to one side and merely held that Congress
had not delegated the power to be used except in complaint cases. 10 But
7Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208, 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 505(1946), followed in Penfield Co. v. S. E. C., 330 U. S. 585, .67 Sup. Ct. 918 (1947).8Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501, 63 Sup. Ct. 339 (1944). See F. H.
Sherwood, The Enforcenwnt of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1944).9Blair v. U. S., 250 U. S. 273, 282, 39 Sup. Ct. 468, 471 (1918).1OHarriman v. I. C. C., 211 U. S. 407, 29 Sup. Ct. 115 (1908). To the same effect
F. T. C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 336 (1924), and Cudahy
Packing Co. v. U. S., 15 F. 2d 133 (C. C. A. 7th 1926). A much more liberal interpre-
tation is found in the case of state commissions at least with respect to corporations
created by or admitted to the state. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S.
541, 28 Sup. Ct. 178 (1907) ; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup.
Ct. 370 (1908).
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when the Interstate Commerce Commission statute was broadened in 1910
the Court held that no constitutional guarantee had been breached.'1 Con-
stitutional limitations with respect to searches and seizures remaining, how-
ever, seem reducible to two: (1) The court will usually interpret the statute
narrowly and assume the lack of any power not expressly given ;12 and (2)
the subject under investigation must be one upon which Congress is able
to legislate. That is, the subpoena power given an administrative body by
the Congress can be no greater than the power which Congress could itself
exercise. The same limits seemingly apply in the use of questionnaires and
regular reports.' 3
Self-Incrinination
The immunity from compulsory self-incrimination in administrative pro-
ceedings is said to be as extensive as that in ordinary adversary adjudica-
tion.' 4 As a matter of practice most federal agencies inform witnesses of
this privilege although presumably this is not necessary. The statutes of the
more important federal agencies permit the agency to compel disclosure if
immunity to prosecution for the crime is given. Such a guarantee has been
held to be a constitutional minimum.' 5 At one time mere issuance of the
subpoena alone gave the immunity. More recently, an express overruling
of the claim by the agency has been required and has become a feature of
the statutes as well.16 But such silence may be purchased at a high price.
Thus it has been held that refusal to testify itself may furnish the basis of
an inference in administrative proceedings if the witness is not seeking to
11Smith v. I. C. C., 245 U. S. 33, 38 Sup. Ct. 30 (1917). See also Champlain Ref.
Co. v. U. S., 329 U. S. 29, 67 Sup. Ct. 1 (1946). A similar right to carry on investi-
gations with the aid of subpoenas has been given the S. E. C. 54 STAT. 853, 15 U. S. C.
§ 80-b-9 (b) (1940). .owever this clause has never been challenged as to its con-
stitutionality.
1 2Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 62 Sup. Ct. 651 (1942);
La Porta v. Bitker, 145 F. 2d 445 (C. C. A. 7th 1944). There is some evidence, how-
ever, of a relaxation of this requirement; compare Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking &
Lumber Co., 331 U. S. 111, 67 Sup. Ct. 1129 (1947).
'
3 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621 (1910); Bart-
lett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 56 F. 2d 245 (N. D. Ill. 1932) ; Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde,
65 F. 2d 350 (C. C. A. 7th 1933).
'4U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 52 Sup. St. 63 (1931). See Note, 54 H.Av. L. REv.
1214 (1941). The Federal Constitution is less stringent with respect to state action.
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947).
15Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644 (1895) ; in spite of several earlier
lower court decisions which held that the evidence thus obtained could not be used,
although the crime revealed could be prosecuted on other evidence. In re Strouse, 23
Fed. Cas. 261, No. 13,548 (D. Nev. 1871) and cases cited.
'
6 Compare Sherwin v. U. S., 268 U. S. 369, 45 Sup. Ct. 517 (1924) ; and Benetti v.
U. S., 97 F. 2d 263 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
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enforce a right.17 Presumably also such silence may be used against the
respondent'by those tribunals whose findings of fact are final, if other sup-
porting evidence exists.
This is not a right possessed by a corporation, whether the subpoena is
issued to the corporation,' 8 or to the officer.' 9 While in other than adminis-
trative law cases it is clear that the claim will be investigated by the court
and a simple assertion of the privilege will not ordinarily discharge the
respondent from producing the records demanded for the court's inspec-
tion,20 the rule in the admininstrative law field has been subject to consid-
erable recent change. Originally, the court would hear such pleadings in
interlocutory proceedings for the enforcement of the administrative sub-
poena,2 ' but since the Endicott Johnson decision as we have seen, the court's
function at this stage approaches a routine one. Presumably such questions
will now be determined in the first instance by the administrative tribunal,
and finally in separate criminal court proceedings based upon any evidence
thus uncovered.
Jury Trial22
The federal constitutional guarantee of a trial before a judge and jury is,
at the very least, incompatible with the objectives and forms of administra-
tive action. Half-hearted efforts to reconcile these contradictory methods
have taken two forms:
1. Judicial trials de novo with a jury of a cause previously determined
without a jury.23 Such was the early practice in the District of Colum-
bia courts. And in New England for a time there was a statutory right
to jury trial and then to an appellate court retrial with a jury. As
far as is known, this practice has never been used with respect to re-
view of decisions of national administrative authorities, although ad-
'7U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r. of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 47 $up. Ct. 302
(1926).
lBWilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538 (1910).
19 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1908). Nor may the officer invoke
it in his own behalf. Drier v. U. S., 221 U. S. 394, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (1910) ; Wheeler v.
U. S., 226 U. S. 478, 33 Sup. Ct. 158 (1912) (with respect to papers and records in
his custody).
2ORe Consolidated Rendering Co., 80 Vt. 55, 66 Atl. 790 (1907); aff'd, 207 U. S.
541, 28 Sup. Ct. 178 (1908).2 1Commonwealth v. Southern Express Co., 160 Ky. 1, 169 S. W. 517 (1914).
2 2 See generally Note, 56 HARv. L. REv. 282 (1942).
23 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301 (1887) ; Capital Traction Co. v.
Hop, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580 (1898).
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ministrative action may give rise to criminal prosecution where the
administrative decision is collaterally attacked.2
2. Administrative findings are made prima fade correct with judicial
review of them provided in a court using a jury.2 5
Since these have proved unsatisfactory expedients, the most common line
of reasoning adopted by the federal courts to reconcile administrative pro-
cedure with the guarantee of jury trial maintains that the guarantee applies
only to those proceedings in which a jury was used at the common law. Thus,
the prosecution of petty offenses does not require a jury since such offenses
were triable before manorial, and other non-common law courts. Much is
made of the language of the Seventh Amendment. Since it guarantees the
"right" of trial by jury rather than "jury trial," the reference is to the extent
of the right and in the circumstances provided for in the common law of
England as of 1791.26 Seemingly in such cases where the administrative
action must be quickly made, the delay of a jury trial is recognized as un-
necessary since it would destroy the effectiveness of government. For when,
in the opinion of -the court, time is not so important, the jury trial has been
required. Thus, the collection of "taxes" which are found to be not taxes
but criminal penalties may not be entrusted to administrative agents with-
out jury trial.2 Yet other administrative penalties may be imposed without
jury trials; for example, punishment of those responsible for admitting
aliens into the United States who are afflicted with communicable diseases,28
or the destruction or confiscation of property which is a menace to health or
safety.29 The proceedings of courts-martial which are openly penal in nature
24Cf. U. S. v. Garvin, 71 F. Supp. 545 (W. D. Pa. 1947).
25Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 236 U. S. 412, 35 Sup. Ct 328 (1914) ; Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920).26Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235 (U. S. 1819). And see JOSEPH SroREY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U. S. 1778-1789 (1833); Dirick V.
Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 Sup. Ct. 296 (1934) ; Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101,
105-106, 48 Sup. Ct 43, 44 (1927), "It is within the undoubted power of Congress to pro-
vide any reasonable system for the collection of taxes and the recovery of them, when
illegal, without a jury trial-if only the injunction against the taking of property without
due process of law in the method of collection and protection of the taxpayer is satisfied."27Dukich v. Blair, 3 F. 2d 302 (E. D. Wash. 1925); Regal Drug Co. v. Wordell,
260 U. S. 386, 43 Sup. Ct. 152 (1922).28Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671 (1908);
or deportation of aliens, Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F. 2d 927 (C. C. A. 9th 1944). Pre-
sumably administrative agents may even be empowered to find individual aliens guilty
of illegal entry and to expel them. But no imprisonment or property confiscation can
take place in such cases without a jury. Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup.
Ct. 977 (1895).29See CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING, HAYS, THE JuDIcIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL AD-
mixiSTRATiE AGENCIES c. III (1942).
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are not violative of the jury trial guarantee simply because "The power of
Congress to provide- for the trial and punishment of military and naval
offenses in the manner practiced by civilized nations is conferred quite inde-
pendent of the Third Article of the Constitution defining the Judicial
power."30 With respect to some other activities, the reasoning seems to he
that the function will be better performed without rather than with a jury.
This is so where the function involves expertness in fact finding, such as
assessment of damage or property values in condemnation proceedings,3 1
workmen's compensation;32 or reparation orders.33
Although the courts are remarkably uniform in not requiring a jury trial,
the above by no means exhausts the reasons given. Thus with respect to
removal from office, jury trial is not required, sometimes because this would
destroy the public's remedy in that the term of office would expire long
before the completion of the trial in many cases; and sometimes because the
lack of this right was one of the conditions of the position accepted by the
incumbent.3 4
Procedural Due Process of Law
Closely associated with the foregoing guarantees is the Fifth Amendment
assurance of procedural due process of law. Historically, as Professor Gell-
horn has pointed out,3 5 the specific content of this phrase has been deter-
mined by two factors: what the judge believes is fair, and what has been
done customarily and by long usage. These requirements which concern
the forms of notice, hearing, findings, and the deciding function, have be-
come in the last generation in particular so technical that their substantive
content cannot be analyzed at any one place and time. Consequently, I am
limiting this analysis to only one aspect of the whole field, the judicial cri-
teria of fairness. For actually, Professor Gellhorn's two factors come to
this, since the traditional forms of the common law or extended usage are
regarded by the judicial mind as Coke's "absolute perfection of reason" by
virtue of their antiquity.
3OReilly v. Pescor,-- 156 F. 2d 632, 635 (C. C. A. 8th 1946). Compare Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
31U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519, 3 Sup. Ct. 346, 350 (1883); Bauman v. Ross,
167 U. S. 548, 593, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 970 (1896).32Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 45, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 297 (1931) ; Abrecht-Lynch
Corp. v. Clark, 30 F. 2d 144 (D. Md. 1929). "
33N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laukhlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 48, 57 Sup. Ct. 615,-629
(1936).
34Cf. Note, 3 A. L. R. 232 (1919).
3GGELLORN, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 335 et seq. (1940).
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1. When Are Notice and Hearing Required. In the first place it is quite
clear that the requirements of notice, etc., are. not invariable. Exceptions
are of two kinds: those traditional and familiar to the common lawyer; and
those where the inequity of such a requirement in a new field of regulation
is obvious and irrefutable.
With respect to the first, the Supreme Court of the United States as early
as 185636 pointed out that "due process" was not always "judicial process"
and that the common law was not unacquainted with executive and sum-
mary procedure without the safeguards of the judicial system. The Supreme
Court of Michigan in 1874 enumerated some of the situations in which com-
mon law guarantees of fair play were not required, and concluded by saying:
"A day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, but admin-
istrative proceedings rest upon different principles. The party affected
by them may always test their validity by a suit instituted for the pur-
pose, and this is supposed to give him ample protection. To require that
the action of the government, in every instance where it touches the right
of the individual citizen, shall be preceded by a judicial order or sen-
tence after a hearing, would be to give the judiciary a supremacy in the
state, and seriously to impair and impede the efficiency of executive
action."37
Such fields of action where notice and hearing were not required at the
common law as a prerequisite to action include among other subjects mili-
tary law,3 8 taxation,39 eminent domain,40 and public health and safety meas-
ures.4 '
The second type of exception those situations unknown to the common
law, but where substantial justice would not seem to require notice and hear-
ing as preliminary to action-have recently been summarized by the Supreme
Court as comprised of those decisions which "leave no doubt that when
justified by compelling public interest the legislature may authorize sum-
mary action subject to later judicial review of its validity."' 42 Specifically,
such instances include:
a. Legislative administrative action such as a rate order, where the
courts are open to review before penalties run against respondents.
4 3
36Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land. & Imp. Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1855).37Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 215 (1874), cited in GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW CASES AND CO11JENTS, 335 et seq. (1940).
38Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
3 9Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441, 36 Sup. Ct 141 (1915).4 0Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 62 (1919).
4 People ex rel. Lodes v. Dep't of Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907).42Yakus v. U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 442, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 676 (1944).43Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 29 Sup. Ct. 50 (1908). But
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b. Closely associated with this exception is the general agreement by the
courts that most other administrative rule-making need not be pre-
ceded by notice and hearing.44
c. Suspension or even revocation of licenses to engage in business activi-.
ties which are termed by the courts privileges rather than rights.45 The
power of suspension pending hearing is given to many federal agen-
cies by statute without any fine distinction between privileges and
rights being made by the courts or the Congress.46
d. Where the publicity attendant on notice and hearing would be injuri-
ous to a private individual, e.g., requiring a respondent to reveal
trade secrets"
e. Where, notice and hearing would result in public injury due to the
need for speed, e.g., suspension of mailing privileges on a charge and
pending a hearing for misuse of the mails, or daily and bi-weekly
market quotas fixed by the Agricultural Marketing Administration,
or investigation of reserve requirements of national banks by the Comp-
troller of the Currency.
f. Where no compelling reason seems to require them and where no in-
terest would be served, as administrative decisions based solely on
inspections, tests or elections.
2. Must Findings Be Prepared by the Hearing Officer? Due process seem-
ingly requires that findings accompany any decision or order whether recom-
mendatory or final. Where the evidence is collected by one subordinate,
conclusions and recommendations may not be made by another who was not
present,48 unless the new subordinate conducts a second hearing 4 9 The
question of whether the death of a trial examiner during a hearing necessi-
tates a complete rehearing is still an open one. Early last year such a re-
hearing was ordered by a circuit court, but this decision was vacated by
where such administrative orders are final, they must be preceded by these safeguards.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462 (1889);
Southern Ry. C6. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 54 Sup. Ct. 148 (1933).
44 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F. 2d 608 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Brown v. Winter, 50 F.
Supp. 804 (W. D. Wis. 1943).4 5Tuttrup, Necessity of Notice and Hearing in the Revocation of Occupational Li-
censes, 4 Wis. L. REv. 180 (1927).
46C. A. A., 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 401 (1946); Packers and Stockyards
Act, 42 STAT. 164 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 207-e (1940). Compare Ashbacker v. F. C. C.,
326 U. S. 327, 66 Sup. Ct 148 (1945), and Malonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. 418 (S. D.
Cal. 1946), rev'd, 332 U. S. 245, 67 Sup. C. 1552 (1947).47Norivegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S., 288 U. S. 294, 53 Sup. Ct. 350 (1933).
48U. S. ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
49U. S. ex rel. Minute v. Reimer, 83 F. 2d 166 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
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the Supreme Court at the request of the respondent so the question re-
mains unanswered.50 In such event the courts are much impressed with the
wastefulness of requiring a complete rehearing and seem to believe that fair-
ness to all parties will be better served by speed than by requiring recom-
mendations to be furnished the deciding officers by the one who had oppor-
tunity to see and judge the witness. When the hearing is held before a de-
ciding body itself, a change in personnel is not fatal.5' Apparently this is in
part because the courts recognize the need of such officers to depend upon
time saving devices such as sitting in divisions; and in part because it is
recognized that there is no constitutional right to appear and present oral
argument before such a body if a hearing has already been offered at some
prior stage of the proceedings,52 or if no substantial injustice in the particu-
lar case will be produced by a denial of an opportunity to argue orally. 3
Where recommendations and findings are made by subordinates, however,
there must be an opportunity for the person adversely affected to challenge
them before a final decision,54 although the deciding body need not forewarn
a respondent of its intent to reverse findings and recommendations of a trial
examiner which are favorable to respondent. 5
3. Content of Findings. Here the decisions seemingly require the admin-
istrative body to make findings of fact of three types: jurisdictional;56 evi-
dentiary; and ultimate.57 Beyond this point it is impossible to generalize
since, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the federal courts, the specific
facts included within each class will vary with the circumstances of the case.
4. Reviewability of the Decision or Order. It is clear that Congress may
not, consistent with due process, forbid judicial review of- administrative
action which directly affects or threatens immediately to impair vested legal
rights of person or property. s It is equally clear that Congress. may not
authorize judicial review, consistent with the case or controversy concept,
of forms of administrative action which fail to meet this standard. Adminis-
trative action may be unreviewable because it does not directly affect individual
5OF. T. C. v. Buchabaum & Co., 328 U. S. 818, 66 Sup. Ct. 1016 (1946).
MEastland Co. v F. C.- C., 92 F. 2d 467' (App. D. C. 1937), cert. dedied, 302 U. S.
735, 58 Sup. Ct. 120 (1937).521Nforgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct 906 (1936).53Yakus v. U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660 (1944).
54Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773 (1937).55N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F. 2d 221 (C. C. A. 3d 1940); F.
R. C. v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285-6, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 636 (1933).
56U. S. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454, 55 Sup. Ct. 268 (1935).
57Saginaw-Broad. Co. v. F. C: C., 96 F. 2d 554 (App. D. C. 1938); U. S. v. Pyne,
313 U. S. 127, 61 Sup. Ct. 893 (1941).
5S8Yakus v. U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660 (1944).
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legal rights, as is true of most administrative rules ;69 or because the threat
is not immediate, for example, advisory administrative orders ;60 or it is
preliminary, such as a certification order of the National Labor Relations
Board. 61 Since this subject falls at least in part within the scope of substan-
tive due process, no more will be said here.
It is important to note, however, that the courts are coming to emphasize
these procedural questions almost to the exclusion of substantive issues. In
such judicial control, the courts frequently advise the agency whose action
is being reviewed of better methods or practices than the minimum require-
ments of due process. Thus recently a federal court advised the Civil Aero-
nautics Board that it should not have permitted a trial examiner to argue
the case for his proposed order before the Board, although the practice was
admittedly not reversible error.62
The New Administrative Procedure Bill 63
No discussion of procedural due process is complete these days without
some reference to aspects of the new administrative procedural code approved
by the 79th Congress. The principal restrictions imposed on what has
hitherto been permissible under procedural due process are:
1. Notice must precede all administrative acts, here called rules, where
the statutes do not at present require it.64
2. An opportunity to participate in such rule-making is offered to "inter-
ested parties" in all the above cases of the issuance of administrative rules.
59Varney v. Warhime, 147 F. 2d 238 (C. C. A. 6th 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S.
882, 65 Sup. Ct. 1575 (1945).6OEmployers Group v. N. W. L. B., 143 F. 2d 145 (App. D. C. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 735, 65 Sup. Ct. 72 (1944).61N. L. R. B. v. Int. Brotherhood of Elect. Workers, 308 U. S. 413, 60 Sup. Ct. 306
(1940). Compare Parker v. Fleming, 329 U. S. 531, 67 Sup. Ct. 463 (1947).620'Caroll v. C. A. B., 144 F. 2d 993 (App. D. C. 1944). See also S. H. Camp &
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 160 F. 2d 519 (C. C. A. 6th 1947).63Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., c. 324 (June 11, 1946), 60 STAT. 237-44, 5
U. S. C. A. § 1001-1011 (Supp. 1946).64Except where (1) judicial review is by trial de novo; (2) a government employee's
tenure is involved; (3) decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections; (4) mili-
tary, naval, or foreigh affairs are involved; (5) or in the case of rules where such
notice is shown to be impractical, to concern matters of internal management of an
agency or matters of public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts. This pre-
sumably includes everything from the prescription of railroad accounting methods to
an income tax rule. But see Churchill Tab. v. F. C. C., 160 F. 2d 244 (App. D. C.
1947), holding that this agency is not bound by its own prior decision even with respect
to the same respondent. Ames Power & Light Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U. S. 90, 67 Sup. Ct.
133 (1946), holding that rules need not precede decisions.
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And until the opportunity has been offered and presumably exhausted, the
rule cannot be issued regardless of the exigencies.
3. In all cases of rule-making where statutes now require a hearing and
in all cases of adjudication, decisions must be preceded by a tentative find-
ing and proposed decision to which the respondent has a right to present
objections and alternatives either orally or in writing.65 And even before
such a tentative decision and finding, the agency must permit the submis-
sion of proposed findings and conclusions by the parties. The well recog-
nized and judicially established distinctions between administrative acts
affecting rights, those which concern benefits, and those which concern police
matters, etc., are thus eliminated at one blow. Further, decisions must be
supported by evidence even though in many cases of rule-making the con-
siderations involved cannot be reduced to evidentiary terms.
4. Investigations are limited to those authorized by law and the courts
are instructed to sustain any subpoena "upon contest" to the "extent that
it is found to be in accordance with law. . . " Thus the re-establishment of
interlocutory judicial review is to be encouraged after having been tried and
found unsatisfactory.
5. The burden of proof is placed on the proponent of a rule or decision
-which, when applied to the government, would make administrative action
impossible in many cases. This is so not only because it implies that rules
referred to above must be supported by evidence, but also because this statute
does not even specify what is to be proved.
6. Licenses can be granted, suspended, or revoked only after a formal
adjudicatory procedure, regardless of whether the license involved is one
granted to a grain inspector of the Department of Agriculture, or a broad-
cast license for a radio station. It is to be noted also that no recognition is
given by the statute to the well recognized legal distinction between grant-
ing and revoking a license, or to the distinction made between suspension
and revocation of licenses referred to above.
Let me emphasize that these are only a few of the changes to be imposed
on existing administrative procedures-those within our frame of reference
here.66 That they narrow administrative discretion previously permitted
under judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment" cannot be denied
as a legal proposition. Nor has it been argued to my satisfaction that this
I 5This provision includes license suspension or revocation except in cases of willful-
ness, or where the public health, interest or safety requires otherwise.66See, for a more exhaustive analysis, Blachly and Oatman, Sabotage of the Admlnis-
trative Process, 6 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 213 (1946).
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statute does other than irreparably damage the balance spoken of at the be-
ginning, between individual rights and the general welfare, a balance which
can be maintained only through refinements in procedure based upon study
of individual agencies and practices. Certainly problems of the sort dis-
cussed here can never be finally solved by any static formula in a dynamic
society.
